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"You Crossed the Fog Line!"-Kansas, Pretext,
and the Fourth Amendment
Melanie D. Wilson*
1. INTRODUCTION

"Dropsy testimony" is testimony by a police officer, typically during
a suppression hearing, claiming that a defendant dropped illegal drugs,
" After the
"thus leaving them in plain view or abandoning them ....
United States Supreme Court's 1961 landmark decision in Mapp v.
Ohio,2 in which the Court held that the exclusionary rule applies to the
states, in addition to the federal government, there was a reported spike
in police dropsy testimony. Irving Younger, former prosecutor, judge,
and law professor,' explained the spike this way: Soon after Mapp,
"police made the great discovery that if the defendant drops the narcotics
on the ground, after which the policeman arrests him, the search is
reasonable and the evidence is admissible. ' 4 The implication was that
police were distorting the truth to prevent judges from suppressing
inculpatory evidence and to save their drug cases from eventual
dismissal.5
In Kansas, there may be a more modem-day type of dropsy
testimony designed to justify pretextual drug investigations of out-ofstate cars with Hispanic drivers. A stop is "pretextual" when officers use
Associate Professor, the University of Kansas School of Law. My sincerest thanks go to
Christopher R. Drahozal, Jelani Jefferson Exum, Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, and L.M. Reeves for
providing thoughtful and constructive comments on an earlier draft. I also owe many thanks to my
talented research assistants Josh A. Bender and Chris Grenz.
1. Donald Dripps, The Case for the Contingent Exclusionary Rule, 38 AM. CPM.L. REv. 1,
n. 110 (200 1). See also Andrew E. Taslitz, The Expressive FourthAmendment: Rethinking the Good
FaithException to the Exclusionary Rule, 76 MISS. L.J. 483, 557 (2006) (explaining that in "dropsy"
cases, officers "testify that a fleeing suspect conveniently 'dropped' or abandoned drugs while in
flight, thus losing any privacy protection under the Fourth Amendment").
2. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
3. See Stephen Labaton, Irving Younger, Lawyer, 55, Dies; Judge, Law Professorand Author,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1988, Obituaries, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1988/03/15
/obituaries/irving-younger-lawyer-55-dies-judge-law-professor-and-author.html.
4. Irving Younger, Constitutional Protection on Search and Seizure Dead?, TRIAL, Aug.Sept. 1967, at 41.
5. Id.
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a valid reason for a traffic stop to carry out some other investigatory
purpose for which there is no legal justification.6 A stop would also be
pretextual if an officer lied and said that a traveler committed a traffic
violation, creating a false basis to stop a car.7 The first pretext is legal,
the second unlawful in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 8 A review of
data from the District of Kansas indicates that Kansas police 9 rely on
minor traffic violations as an excuse to stop and look in out-of-state cars
and to gain face-to-face interaction with certain travelers whom they
speculate may be transporting drugs. Sometimes Kansas police stop a
car, citing a dirty tag or a faulty tag light. 10 Recently, officers have relied
on lane violations as grounds for traffic stops. Lane infractions allow
Kansas police to stop a car when a driver veers, even just a bit, from his
lane of travel and touches or crosses a center line or a "fog line."" Once
an officer stops the car for drifting from one lane, the officer engages the
occupants with questions about their travel plans, advises them that he
will merely issue a warning for the minor infraction, and, having gained
their gratitude for the painless warning, asks the occupants for
permission to search the car, or their bodies, clothing, or belongings. If,
during the stop, the officer ultimately uncovers what he intends to
find' 2 --contraband-the defendant is charged with a crime, sometimes
in federal court.1 3 At a subsequent hearing to evaluate a defendant's
6. See United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1515 (10th Cir. 1995) ("A pretextual stop
occurs when the police use a legal justification to make the stop in order to search a person or place,
or to interrogate a person for an unrelated serious crime for which they do not have the reasonable
suspicion necessary to support a stop."), overruled on other grounds by United States v. BoteroOspira, 71 F.3d 783 (10th Cir. 1995).
7. See Patricia Leary & Stephanie Rae, Toward a State Constitutional Check on Police
Discretion to Patrolthe FourthAmendment's Outer Frontier,69 TEMP. L. REV. 1007, 1009 (1996)
(defining pretext as "a legal justification that is used to mask the real, legally unjustifiable motive for
a seizure").
8. Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1515; Leary & Rae, supra note 7, at 1009.
9. Except where otherwise indicated, in this Article "police" includes local, county, state, and
federal peace officers who work anywhere within the District of Kansas.
10. See, e.g., United States v. Paez, No. 09-40006-JAR, 2009 WL 1739907, at *I (D. Kan. June
18, 2009) (Kansas State Trooper conducts stop of tractor trailer for illegible Indiana tag); United
States v. Johnson, No. 08-40010-01-RDR, 2009 WL 1468486, at *1 (D. Kan. May 22, 2009)
(Potowatomi Tribal Police cite tag light violation and failing to signal as basis for a stop).
11. A "fog line" is the white line on the right-hand side of a road, separating the lane for travel
from the shoulder.
12. This inference about the officers' intentions is one drawn from the data, especially the data
showing that officers issue warnings, not citations, for fog-line infractions and that they quickly
move from a discussion of the infraction to inquiry of possible drug trafficking.
13. More drug cases are prosecuted in state court than in federal court. See, e.g., Office of
National Drug Control Policy Drug Policy Information Clearinghouse, State of Kansas Profile of
Drug Indicators, June 2008, available at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicygov/statelocal/ks/ks.pdf
(showing that in 2006, the federal Drug Enforcement Agency made 255 arrests for drug violations in
Kansas while overall there were 11,937 adult drug arrests in the state during that time).
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motion to suppress the contraband,1 4 the officer testifies to his reason for
the stop---"you crossed the fog line," "drifted from your lane of travel,"
or "failed to maintain a single lane." The officer typically makes no
mention of the reasons for selecting this particular car for careful
scrutiny. As long as an officer has a legally sufficient reason to stop a
car, his ulterior motives in a given5 case are viewed as irrelevant for
purposes of the Fourth Amendment.'
This Article urges readers to stand back from any one particular fogline case, in which it appears that an officer acted diligently and
perceptively, uncovering a significant crime during a standard traffic
stop, and to look for patterns emerging from a series of cases. From this
multi-case perspective, it seems that fog-line stops may be nothing more
than a pretext for drug investigations. Some of these pretextual stops
probably follow from an actual traffic infraction. Other fog-line stops
may amount to a new type of police dropsy testimony in that Kansas
police come to federal court and offer a post-hoc justification for an
otherwise unlawful search that, nevertheless, uncovered contraband.
Given the limited data, there is no way to know whether Kansas police
are engaging in lawful, but controversial, pretextual stops or, conversely,
dishonestly claiming to witness lane drifts that never occurred. In either
event, Kansas officers (consciously or subconsciously) appear to be
acting on unreliable stereotypes, such as skin color and out-of-state
status, in deciding which cars to stop and investigate.
In making a case for increased attention to fog-line (and similar)
traffic stops, this Article proceeds in three parts. Part II examines data
from orders recently decided in the District of Kansas to show,
circumstantially, that Kansas police are using fog-line violations as a
ruse to stop out-of-state cars driven by people of Hispanic ethnicity. Part
III summarizes the law relevant to pretextual fog-line traffic stops,
including federal and state law governing Kansas police. Finally, Part IV
offers a few observations about why Kansas police should try harder to
avoid pretextual fog-line stops.
II. RECENT JUDICIAL ORDERS FROM THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
This Article is informed by my review of criminal orders deciding
motions to suppress evidence issued recently by federal trial judges in
14. The exclusionary rule generally precludes the use of evidence from a defendant's criminal
trial when police gathered the evidence by violating the Fourth Amendment and certain other
constitutional provisions. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
15. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) and discussion infra Part III.A.
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the District of Kansas. I reviewed all criminal orders published on the
"Recent Opinions" section of the website for the United States District
Court for the District of Kansas for the period August 1, 2008 through
September 15, 2009 (a period of approximately thirteen months).' 6 I
began my review on September 10, 2009. In all, I reviewed 476 orders
and culled those for rulings on motions to suppress.17 During the
applicable time period, the court decided thirty-five motions to
suppress.' 8 A list of these thirty-five orders, with accompanying case
names, numbers, and other pertinent information, follows this Article as
an appendix. Of the court's thirty-five orders, nine (about 26%) involved
evidence seized during a traffic stop, as compared to evidence uncovered
during the search of a home or office, or the search of a car for reasons
In five of the nine traffic stops
other than a traffic violation.
(approximately 56%), Kansas police cited a fog-line infraction or similar
lane drift as the reason for the stop. 19 Although Kansas police
purportedly stopped all five vehicles for leaving their lane of travel,
when considered as a group, officers appeared to have a different reason
for each of the stops. While the sample size is admittedly small, the
16. The orders can be accessed at http://www.ksd.uscourts.gov/ under the Recent Opinions
link.
17. In theory, the 476 number would represent every order issued in a criminal case during the
specified time because the website is designed to provide access to all publically-available orders
from the court. But information obtained from the Clerk's Office, United States District Court for
the District of Kansas, indicates that each judge's chambers is responsible for posting its own orders.
Therefore, if there is human error in publishing the orders to the website, the errors will result in
fewer than all orders on the site. As a result, it is likely that judges in the District of Kansas issued
more than 476 criminal orders in the given time period. In addition, sealed orders are unavailable by
definition.
18. This number reflects all of the motions to suppress that are available on the court's website
in the approximately thirteen-month period. Occasionally, a defendant filed a motion to reconsider a
motion to suppress. These motions for reconsideration are also included in the count of orders on
motions to suppress.
19. These cases include United States v. Gonzalo Maldonado, No. 09-40031-SAC, 2009 WL
2760798, at * I (D. Kan. Aug. 26, 2009) (claiming that the defendant crossed over the center line);
United States v. Jose Maldonado, 614 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1180 (D. Kan. 2009) (asserting that car
drifted slightly into another lane); United States v. Perales, No. 08-40055-JAR, 2008 WL 4974807,
at * 1 (D. Kan. Nov. 19, 2008) (asserting that vehicle crossed the fog line); United States v. Rocha,
No. 06-40057-RDR, 2008 WL 4498950, at *1 (D. Kan. Oct. 2, 2008) (claiming that recreational
vehicle crossed the fog line); United States v. Diaz, No. 08-10100-MLB, 2008 WL 3154664, at *1
(D. Kan. Aug. 5, 2008) (asserting that car crossed the fog line and center line).
The other four orders involving traffic stops revealed that vehicles were cited for: (1) an
illegible tag, United States v. Paez, No. 09-40006-JAR, 2009 WL 1739907, at * I (D. Kan. June 18,
2009); (2) a positive sniff from a drug-dog in a parking lot, United States v. Johnson, No. 08-40010RDR, 2009 WL 1468486, at *I (D. Kan. May 22, 2009); (3) speeding in a work zone while under
surveillance by the Drug Enforcement Agency, United States v. Beltran-Aguilar, No. 08-20106KHV, 2009 WL 103642, at *2 (D. Kan. Jan. 14, 2009); and (4) suspicious activity while parked in a
parking lot, United States v. Salazar, No. 08-20084-KHV, 2009 WL 352605, at *1 (D. Kan. Feb. 12,
2009).
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orders are informative. They show a pattem-in all five cases, Kansas
police targeted out-of-state cars driven by people of Hispanic ethnicity so
that they could obtain the occupants' permission to search the vehicles
for drugs.2 °
A. Recent Pretextual Police Stops in Kansas

During the thirteen months reviewed, at least nine minor traffic
infractions ultimately resulted in felony criminal cases in federal court.
In eight of those nine traffic-stop cases (approximately 89%), the
defendants appear to have been of Hispanic ethnicity.2 1 In five of the
nine cases, the federal criminal case began with a lane violation, and
100% of the defendants and the other occupants of the vehicles in those
lane-violation cases appear to have been Hispanic. The defendants and
other occupants include: Jose Maldonado; Gonzalo Maldonado and
Manuel Garcia; Felipe Perales; Luis Diaz and Stephen Demalleo; and
Julian Rocha, Ericka Rocha, and Gerardo
percentage of Hispanic defendants stands out
relatively small Hispanic and Latino population.
of Kansas was approximately 2,802,134, and

Gaxiola.22
The high
because Kansas has a
In 2008, the population
persons of Hispanic or

20. I wondered how officers could see into cars from significant distances to select certain
drivers. An interview of a current federal public defender in the District of Kansas revealed that
often the police pull up beside a car before falling back and activating the patrol car's lights or siren,
signaling for the citizen driver to pull over. The federal defender's information is corroborated by
the facts in the Diaz case in which the Trooper pulled alongside the car occupied by defendants
Demalleo and Diaz. See Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Joint Motion to Suppress
Evidence, United States v. Diaz [and Demalleol, No. 08-10100-MLB, 2008 WL 3154664 (D. Kan.
Jul. 7, 2008).
21. By Hispanic, I mean to suggest ancestral ties to Mexico, Puerto Rico, Cuba, or South or
Central America. This observation rests primarily on the names of the defendants, each of whom
was identified by a common Hispanic surname. But in some cases, the ethnicity of the defendant
was confirmed by his own pleading (usually a brief in support of the motion to suppress), the judge's
order, or the transcript of the hearing on the motion to suppress. (When readily available, these court
documents were accessed through Pacer.) For instance, in the case of defendant Perales, the judge's
order, which denies the defendant's motion to suppress, implies that the defendant's primary
language is Spanish, supporting the inference that he is of Hispanic ethnicity. See Perales,2008 WL
4974807, at *2 (noting that during a post-arrest interview of the defendant, an agent who is "fluent in
Spanish" was available, but not needed, to interpret). In United States v. Gonzalo Maldonado, the
judge's order indicates that the driver of the vehicle spoke little English, supporting the inference
that the defendant is Hispanic. See 2009 WL 2760798, at *1. In the case of Jose Maldonado, the
transcript of the hearing on the motion to suppress reveals cross-examination questions from the
defendant's lawyer confirming that the defendant's ethnicity is Hispanic and references to the
defendant's "limited knowledge of the English language." Jose Maldonado, 614 F. Supp. 2d at
1183. And, in the case of Julian Rocha, the court found that the occupants of the recreational vehicle
did not have "trouble speaking or understanding English." Order of October 2, 2008 at 6, Rocha,
2008 WL 4498950, at *2.
22. See cases cited supra note 21.
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Latino origin made up only 9.1% of the total. 23 Moreover, a study of
police profiling in Kansas published in 2003 found that persons of
Hispanic ethnicity experience more police profiling 24 than black or white
25
citizens.
In each of the five fog-line cases, a Kansas officer 26 reportedly
stopped the defendant's car because the driver drifted from a lane of
travel and breached K.S.A. section 8-1522(a), requiring drivers to stay
"as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane., 27 Despite the lane
drifts, in every case, the officer decided not to issue the driver a ticket.
Instead, the driver was given a "warning. 28 The officer then questioned
the car's occupants about their travel plans, usually including their place
of departure and their intended destination. In every case, the car was
traveling to or through Kansas from out of state. Jose Maldonado was
driving from Texas with a Texas license plate. Julian Rocha was riding
in a rented recreational vehicle driven by Gerardo Gaxiola. Rocha and
Gaxiola were traveling from California, and the R.V. was rented and
registered in California. Defendant Perales was driving from California
to Kansas City. Defendant Demalleo was riding in a car driven by Luis
23. See United States Census Bureau, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/20000.html (last
visited March 11, 2010). The use of census statistics as a benchmark of comparison for racial
profiling is not without critics. See A MultijurisdictionalAssessment of Traffic Enforcement and
Data Collection in Kansas, The Police Foundation, at 11, Feb. 2003 [hereinafter A
Multijurisdictional Assessment] (stating that the use of census data "will not serve as reliable
benchmarks" and relying on surveys of highway transient traffic as a comparator).
24. The study defined racial profiling as "selectively stopping, questioning, and searching
people on the basis of arbitrary minor offenses and the color of their skin." A Mult'urisdictional
Assessment, supranote 23, at xv.
25. Id. at 66. "The data strongly suggest that the Emporia police are targeting Hispanic
motorists." Id. at 77, 80. The data showed that "[t]he Olathe Police Department is stopping more
Black and Hispanic motorists than would be expected on the basis of their presence in the transient
population." Id. at 90. "[T]here are large disparities with regard to Hispanic motorists at the two
locations with the largest number of stops" by the Osage County Sheriff's Department. Id. at 105.
"[T]here are serious disparities shown by the [Kansas Highway Patrol] in the stopping of both Black
and Hispanic motorists." Id. at 127. But see id. at 65-66 (noting that the Wichita Police Department
was taking measures to "fight against racial/ethnic profiling" which were paying off and that stops of
Hispanics were "at the lower range of the benign area").
26. In three of the five cases, the officer was a member of the Kansas Highway Patrol. In one,
the officers worked for the Wichita Police Department. In the remaining case, the officer was an
employee of the Shawnee County Sheriffs Office.
27. This law provides that when a roadway is divided into two clearly marked lanes of traffic,
"[a] vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be
moved from such lane until the driver has first ascertained that such movement can be made with
safety." KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-1522(a) (2008).
28. Compare this 100% warning rate with the fact that out of all stops (traffic and pedestrian)
conducted by officers of the Wichita Police Department Jan. I-June 30, 2001, 57.1% resulted in the
issuance of a citation. See BRIAN L. WITHROW, THE WICHITA STOP STUDY 39 (Midwest Criminal
Justice Institute, Jan. 2002). Interestingly, Wichita police also issued a disproportionate number of
warnings, rather than citations, to Hispanic citizens. See id. at 41.
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Diaz. Demalleo and Diaz, described in the judge's order as two welldressed men, were driving from Denver, returning to Missouri, where the
men had rented a car for the trip. Gonzalo Maldonado, with Manuel
Garcia as his passenger, was stopped by the Kansas29Highway Patrol on
his way from Sacramento, California to Kansas City.
In each case studied, after an officer questioned the occupants and
checked their driver's licenses and the car's registration, the officer
returned the documents and took "a couple of steps back towards the
patrol car' 30 before re-engaging the occupants to ask more questions. 3'
In each of the five fog-line cases, the officers' follow-up questions were
directed at uncovering evidence of drug trafficking. For instance, in the
case involving defendants Gonzalo Maldonado and Garcia, the officer
asked "whether there was anything illegal in the vehicle, such as
'cervesa,' 'pistoles,' drugs, or illegal aliens. 32 In the case of defendant
33
Rocha, the officer asked whether there were "any drugs or contraband.,
After this seemingly scripted give-and-take, in each case, the Kansas

29. See cases cited supra note 19.
30. Defendants' [Diaz and Demalleo] Memorandum in Support of Joint Motion to Suppress
Evidence, supranote 20, at *2 (after returning the occupants' licenses and the car's rental agreement
and giving Diaz a warning for failure to maintain a lane, "Trooper Duffy began walking towards the
back of the Chrysler, only to turn around and ask Mr. Diaz if he could ask a couple of questions").
See also United States v. Gonzalo Maldonado, No. 09-40031-SAC, 2009 WL 2760798, at *3-4 (D.
Kan. Aug. 26, 2009) (explaining that Trooper issued driver a written warning for failing to maintain
a lane and for a registration violation, returned the driver's paperwork, and said "'No ticket. Just a
warning. Thank you."' Then, officer walked to the rear of the vehicle, returned to the passenger
window, and asked if "he could ask the men a few more questions"); United States v. Jose
Maldonado, 614 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1181 (D. Kan. 2009) (officers returned Maldonado's license and
insurance, told him to continue on his way, and then "re-engaged" him to ask more questions about
his travel and to ask for consent to search the vehicle); United States v. Perales, No. 08-40055-JAR,
2008 WL 4974807, at *2 (D. Kan. Nov. 19, 2008) ("Trooper Henderson explained that he did not
intend to give defendant a citation; rather he wanted assurance that defendant was not impaired" and
after "returning defendant's documents" Trooper Henderson "walked to the rear of the Toyota
before returning to ask defendant if he had any illegal drugs in the vehicle"); United States v. Rocha,
No. 06-40057-RDR, 2008 WL 4498950, at *5 (D. Kan. Oct. 2, 2008) (noting that the deputy
returned all of the occupants' documents and gave the driver a warning ticket for failing to maintain
a single lane of travel before telling the driver "thank you" and stepping aside before returning to ask
whether the driver "had any drugs or contraband").
31. Presumably, the officers ended the stop by returning the documents and telling the
occupants they were free to leave because a seizure that is lawful at its inception may become
unconstitutional (in violation of the Fourth Amendment) if its duration exceeds a reasonable time
needed to investigate the basis for the stop. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985);
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1968); see also United States v. Chavira, 467 F.3d 1286, 1290
(10th Cit. 2006) (a seizure justified solely by the interest in issuing a warning ticket can become
unlawful if prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete the mission, so a driver must
be permitted to leave after a routine traffic stop unless an officer has reasonable suspicion or the
driver consents to further questioning).
32. See Gonzalo Maldonado, 2009 WL 2760798, at *4.
33. Rocha, 2008 WL 4498950, at *2.
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officer sought to search the vehicles. 34 In three of the cases, there was
some question about the ability of the car's occupants to understand
English.3 5
Taking the fog-line cases as a whole, the officers' issuance of
warnings rather than tickets appears designed to take advantage of
human nature. 6 A warning causes the driver to relax and to feel grateful
to the officer. Sensing an opportunity to circumvent the need for
probable cause, the officer then asks the driver for consent.37 The driver,
now feeling like he owes the officer something in return for the simple
warning, agrees to the search. Especially in cases involving people
whose first language is not English, the colloquy seems destined to end
in a search, regardless of whether voluntary and knowing consent is
38
given.
The officers' intent to conduct a search is, perhaps, best illustrated in
the one case (of the five) that occupants refused to continue to answer the
officer's questions and never consented to a search. In United States v.

34. In four cases the officer asked for permission to search. In the fifth case, the defendant
began to drive away before the officer could ask.
35. In the case of defendant Felipe J. Perales, the district court noted that the defendant
answered the trooper's questions about drugs "without difficulty communicating." Perales, 2008
WL 4974807, at *2. In the case of Jose Maldonado, the court noted that the defendant's silence in
the face of police questioning may have been due to "his limited knowledge of the English
language." Jose Maldonado, F. Supp. 2d at 1183. And, in the case of Gonzalo Maldonado and
Manuel Garcia, the officer was told by the passenger that the driver "did not communicate very well
in English." Gonzalo Maldonado, 2009 WL 2760798, at * 1.
36. In Kansas officers have extensive discretion in determining whether to issue a citation or
just a warning. It is unclear in what percentage of traffic stops officers decide on the warning. In an
extensive study of traffic enforcement in Kansas published in 2003, the researchers indicated that
there was no uniform policy for collecting and maintaining data about tickets versus warnings. See
A Multyurisdictional Assessment, supra note 23, at 12. The study noted that New Jersey and
Arizona showed high percentages of warnings. Id. at 13 (reporting that Arizona police issue
warnings in 75% of stops and that in New Jersey the percentage is approximately 63%). Data
collected by the Wichita Police Department for the period January 1, 2001 through June 30, 2001
(including police stops of both cars and pedestrians) revealed that "[m]ost stops result in the issuance
of a citation." WITHROW, supra note 28, at Executive Summary.
37. Studies have shown that people are likely to comply with requests from authority figures
and that people feel pressure when dealing with police officers. See David K. Kessler, Free to
Leave? An Empirical Look at the Fourth Amendment's Seizure Standard, 99 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 51, 63-64 (2009) (reviewing some of these studies and reporting results of his own
empirical findings).
38. The fact that an officer requested permission to search in four of the five fog-line cases is
notable because officers do not ask to search during every traffic stop. For instance, data collected
in 2000 from the Wichita Police Department indicated that their officers conducted searches in only
about 12.5% of car stops and that many of these searches were justified as incident to the arrest of
the car's occupants. WITHROW, supra note 28, at Executive Summary. The Wichita study also
revealed that while Wichita Police did not stop a disproportionate number of Hispanic drivers, both
black and Hispanic citizens were more likely to be searched than were non-black and non-Hispanic
persons. Id.
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Diaz, an officer stopped a Chrysler, reporting that the car crossed over
the center line by at least six inches, at least twice.3 9 After checking the
driver's and passengers' paperwork, the officer returned the documents
and issued a warning for the infractions. 40 Then, the officer "took a
couple of steps back towards his patrol car and heard the gear selector
shift." 4 Hearing the driver begin to leave, the officer asked "if he could
ask some more questions[J" but the driver refused, saying "we're
done. 4 2 Intent on searching the car, the officer ordered the driver to
"take the keys out of the ignition, hand them over.., and put the car in
park.4 3 The officer then called another officer to bring a drug dog to the
scene to sniff for drugs. 44
In other words, in all five of the fog-line cases, the officers appeared
to be looking for drugs without probable cause to believe that drugs
would be present in these particular vehicles.4 5 Sometimes it took more
than one search.4 6 Sometimes it took an extended period of time.47
Sometimes officers searched despite the defendant's refusal to consent,48
but officers eventually found illegal drugs in each of the five vehicles.4 9
In two of the five fog-line cases, the defendants later succeeded in
excluding the contraband from use at trial. The trial judge suppressed
39. No. 08-10100-MLB, 2008 WL 3154664, at *1 (D. Kan. Aug. 5, 2008).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Racial and ethnicity profiling is a nationwide concern. See Timothy P. O'Neill, Vagrants
In Volvos: Ending PretextualTraffic Stops and Consent Searches of Vehicles in Illinois, 40 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 745, 747, 771-72 (2009) (reciting literature and studies of "disturbing racial disparities in
traffic enforcement" including study of stops throughout Illinois in which officers "utilized consent
searches against Hispanic drivers more than twice as often as against Caucasian drivers" although
"searches of Caucasians were twice as likely to discover contraband as were the searches of
minorities").
46. See Transcript of Proceedings (Feb. 26, 2009), 22 & Transcript of Proceedings (Mar. 12,
2009), 26-30, United States v. Jose Maldonado, 614 F. Supp. 2d 1179 (D. Kan. 2009) (No. 0810216-01) [hereinafter Transcript of Proceedings] (on file with author) (three officers worked two
different drug dogs on the vehicle until one of the dogs finally alerted to drugs; one police report was
altered, making it appear that it took fewer than three searches to find drugs).
47. Id. See also United States v. Gonzalo Maldonado, No. 09-4003 1-SAC, 2009 WL 2760798,
at *3-4 (D. Kan. Aug. 26, 2009) (explaining how trooper searched car for about ten minutes,
including its front and back seats, trunk and undercarriage and then asked the two defendants to
follow him to a place where he could look under the car, which was about fifteen miles from the
place of the stop).
48. See United States v. Diaz, No. 08-10100-MLB, 2008 WL 3154664, at *1 (after officers
returned occupants' documents and indicated defendants could leave, officer directed driver to put
the car in park and step out).
49. Of course, these cases provide no insight into the number of cars with Hispanic occupants
that were searched but revealed no contraband.
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the evidence after finding that the officers violated the defendant's
Fourth Amendment rights on the way to uncovering the evidence. In
Diaz, the judge granted the defendants' 50 joint motion to suppress crystal
methamphetamine and other drug-related evidence. 51 Although the judge
determined that the initial stop was legally justified by the fog-line
violation, he also ruled that after the officer issued the defendants a
warning citation, "Diaz did not agree to further questioning and was
ordered [without reasonable cause] to put the car in park and surrender
the keys. 52 Because the additional questioning and continued seizure of
car and occupants was neither consensual nor supported by reasonable
suspicion, the Kansas officer violated the Fourth Amendment by
continuing to detain the car so that he could subject it to a drug-dog sniff
and subsequent search.
In United States v. Jose Maldonado, another district court judge
granted the defendant's motion to suppress methamphetamine and
cocaine.53 At the hearing on the motion, officers claimed that they
stopped Maldonado because he committed a lane violation. The judge
suppressed the evidence after finding that one officer's testimony was
not credible. The judge explained:
The government argues that the officers had probable cause to stop the
vehicle because the left side tires of Maldonado's vehicle drifted over
the center line on at least one occasion, and he was weaving within his
own lane. However, prior to the alleged drifting of Maldonado's
vehicle, Officer Cooper testified that the only reason he initially
followed Maldonado was because he had a Texas license plate. Indeed,
he was parked on an exit ramp and pulled onto the roadway for that
reason alone. And, this is the onl portion of Officer Cooper's
testimony that the court finds credible.
This Article applauds the judges' rulings and seeks to show why
Kansas trial judges are right to scrutinize fog-line and similar traffic
stops carefully and to suppress evidence whenever they doubt officers'
testimony about the circumstances of a stop or the Fourth Amendment
reasonableness of other police behavior. Whether the officers' pretextual
50. Defendants were driver and occupant of the car. Id.
51. Id.at*3.
52. Id.at *2.
53. 614 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1184 (D. Kan. 2009).
54. Id.at 1182. But see United States v. Gonzalo Maldonado, No. 09-40031-SAC, 2009 WL
2760798, at *1-2 (D. Kan. Aug. 26, 2009) (rejecting the defendant's argument that officer acted in
violation of the Fourth Amendment in following vehicle, which was traveling from California, for
two to three minutes before witnessing a fog-line violation, noting that officer did not need
reasonable suspicion to follow the car).
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stops are based on actual or phantom violations, the data suggests that
Kansas officers are relying on these infractions to stop a disproportionate
number of Hispanic drivers of out-of-state cars.
B. The Deceptively Attractive Nature of Fog-line Violations
While in five of nine traffic stops, officers cited a fog-line violation
as the reason for the stop, 55 fog-line stops were much more likely to
result in the suppression of evidence than were other traffic infractions or
other cases based on traditional probable cause. In the thirteen-month
period studied, judges in the District of Kansas denied 29 of 35 (83%) of
motions to suppress, thus allowing the introduction of contraband against
the defendants in each of those cases. 56 Of thirty-five motions, judges
granted only three outright and granted, in part, another three.5 7
Nevertheless, in fog-line cases, judges granted the defendants' motions
in two of five cases. 58 In other words, despite the extensive leeway the
law gives officers to make traffic stops for even the smallest traffic
infraction, 59 in 40% (two of five) of the federal cases in which Kansas
police relied on a fog-line violation to justify such a stop, the District
Court of Kansas ruled that officers had overreached and violated the
federal Constitution in their vigor to uncover a more serious crime.6 ° In
Fourth Amendment parlance, the officers acted "unreasonably." Thus,
whether consciously or subconsciously, Kansas federal district court
judges expressed disfavor of fog-line cases through their rulings on
motions to suppress evidence.
Unless officers are aware that fog-line cases have met with
successful motions to suppress a disproportionately large percentage of
the time, "fog-line testimony" might seem to be an ideal justification for
a stop. When the driver of a car violates a traffic law, even a very minor
one, the violation gives the police reasonable grounds to "seize" the
car. 6 1 A legal stop gives the officer an opportunity to look in and smell
55.
56.
57.
another

See supra note 19 (citing nine District of Kansas cases involving traffic stops).
See Appendix infra (citing thirty-five motions, twenty-nine of which were denied).
See Appendix infra (citing thirty-five motions, three of which were granted outright, and
three which were granted in part).

58.

See Jose Maldonado, 614 F. Supp. 2d at 1184 (granting the defendants' motion to

suppress); United States v. Diaz, No. 08-10100-MLB, 2008 WL 3154664, at *3 (D. Kan. Aug. 5,
2008) (granting defendants' motion to suppress).
59. See discussion infra at Part III.
60.

See Jose Maldonado, 614 F. Supp. 2d at 1183-84; Diaz, 2008 WL 3154664 at *2-3.

61. "Although a traffic stop is considered a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes, a traffic
infraction provides reasonable suspicion for a law enforcement officer to conduct the investigatory
detention." State v. Tinoco, No. 100,435, 2009 WL 1591644, at *2, 208 P.3d 361 (Kan. Ct. App.
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the vehicle's interior and to get as close as a few inches from the car's
occupants. A single fog-line violation provides the police with a chance
to ask the occupants questions about their intended destination, their
reasons for traveling, their plans upon arrival, and, importantly, whether
they will agree to a search of their vehicle, purse, clothing, etc. An
added bonus, especially in Kansas, where it is often quite windy, is that
everyone occasionally veers from his own lane of traffic.62 Thus, if the
police wait long enough, they can often rely on a fog-line infraction as a
legitimate reason to stop almost any car or driver. Also, because there is
no prohibition against following a car to observe it, 63 it is conceivable
that nervousness alone may effectively "force" many drivers, especially
minorities and people who are generally fearful of police, to veer, at least
a little, from their lane of travel when they normally would have no
trouble maintaining a single lane.
From a proof standpoint, a fog-line violation would seem to be ideal
for the prosecution. Such violations require no special evidence, no
forensics or video proof. Whereas speeding violations are typically
accompanied by radar evidence, and driving under the influence
violations are proven by breathalyzer or blood/alcohol proof, fog-line
violations typically are established by the officer's testimony alone.
Even when an officer provides video to support the stop, the traffic
violation is usually missing from the video.64 The officer often activates
the camera by turning on his lights or siren, after the alleged infraction.
Even tag violations and infractions for following too closely would
probably be visible in the video, unlike lane drifts.

2009) (table decision) (citing City of Norton v. Wonderly, 172 P.3d 1205, 1209 (Kan. Ct. App.
2007)). See also State v. Marx, 215 P.3d 601, 605 (Kan. 2009) (explaining that a "traffic violation
provides an objectively valid reason to effectuate a traffic stop, even if the stop is pretextual"). See
also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1993), discussed infra at Part III.A.
62. At the hearing on Julian Rocha's motion to suppress, the defendant called an expert witness
who testified that when winds reach forty-five miles per hour, "all vehicles would probably deviate
from their lane." United States v. Rocha, No. 06-40057-RDR, 2008 WL 4498950, at *3 (D. Kan.
Oct. 2, 2008). See also Emily Van Zandt & Karen Dillon, Study finds slowdown in Kansas wind
speed, KAN. CITY STAR, Jul. 20, 2009, at A4 (quoting Mary Knapp, Kansas state climatologist as
saying that Kansas is the "third-windiest state in the U.S." and indicating that wind speeds average
eleven to twelve miles per hour, but in 2009 meteorologists recorded a gust of 120 miles per hour
and another gust of ninety miles per hour that lasted one minute).
63. Following a car or individual is not a search or seizure protected by the Fourth Amendment.
64. For instance, in the case of Julian Rocha, the officer's car was equipped with a video
camera but none of the three alleged fog-line violations was captured on the video, supposedly
because the video was turned on only after the traffic violations, when the officer activated the
emergency lights on the police car. Nevertheless, at the hearing on the motion to suppress, the video
actually began when the RV was already stopped. Rocha, 2008 WL 4498950, at *2. Nevertheless,
the judge deemed the evidence sufficient to deny the defendant's motion to suppress. Id. at *6.
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The lack of tangible evidence of fog-line infraction makes them
uniquely difficult to refute. An officer's word would appear to be more
than adequate to establish reasonable suspicion by the applicable
preponderance-of-the-evidence burden of proof.65 Because most of
Kansas is flat and breezy, it is easy to believe that a car left its lane of
travel, even if it did not. A defendant who contradicts an officer's
testimony with a claim that he or she did not cross the fog line does little
more than generate images of childhood disputes--"Yes, you did. No, I
did not. Yes, you did!" When there is no independent evidence to
contradict an officer's sworn testimony,66 there is no reason for the judge
to doubt the officer's credibility, especially considering that the judge
now knows that contraband was found in the car (or on the defendant)
and that application of the exclusionary rule will, in all likelihood, doom
the government's case.67 Particularly for defendants facing serious
charges, their inherently-biased testimony is highly unlikely to overcome
an officer's version of events.
Because fog-line violations are easy to believe and difficult to refute,
unscrupulous officers might be tempted to adopt them as a favorite
explanation for traffic stops, particularly when they do not have other
reasonable grounds to believe that the car's occupants are committing a
crime. Even if Kansas police do not distort the truth, claiming phantom
fog-line violations, officers appear to pre-select certain drivers and then
use fog-line infractions to justify pretextual drug investigations.
III. THE APPLICABLE LAW

Supreme Court precedent and evolving law in both the Tenth Circuit
and the state courts of Kansas encourage officers to rely on fog-line
violations as grounds to subject a car to a traffic stop. The United States
Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit have given police extensive
discretion to conduct pretextual stops for all types of traffic infractions,
and the Tenth Circuit and Kansas appellate courts permit officers to
prove fog-line infractions with cursory testimony.

65. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 (1974) (describing government's burden of
proof in motions to suppress as preponderance of the evidence).
66. Typically, the only witnesses to the traffic stop and subsequent search will be the police and
the occupants of the car.
67. In both fog-line cases in which the court granted the defendant's motion to suppress, the
government later dismissed the case, presumably because evidence was lacking to proceed to trial.
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United States Supreme CourtPrecedent

The Supreme Court's holdings in Delaware v. Prouse68 and Whren v.
United States69 inform any discussion of whether police have acted
legally when "seizing" a car or truck in a traffic stop and subsequently
subjecting both vehicle and occupants to an investigation, related or
unrelated to the officer's purported reason for the stop.7 ° In Prouse, the
Court declared it "unreasonable," and therefore a violation of the Fourth
Amendment, 71 for a police officer to seize a car without probable cause
or reasonable suspicion to believe "that the car is being driven contrary
to the laws governing the operation of motor vehicles or that either the
car or any of its occupants is subject to seizure or detention in connection
with the violation of any other applicable law."72 The officer in Prouse
violated the Fourth Amendment because he stopped a car without
observing any traffic or equipment violation or any other suspicious
activity.73 The stop was held to be an unconstitutional intrusion on
Fourth Amendment freedoms after the officer forthrightly admitted that
he "saw the car in the area and wasn't answering any complaints," so he
chose to stop the car.74
The mandate of the Prousedecision was clear. In the run-of-the-mill
case, 75 police need "at least articulable and reasonable suspicion" that the
driver or occupants of the car are violating a law before they can legally
conduct a stop. 76 Unbridled police discretion to stop any car, at any time,
even in the interest of public safety, is a breach of the Fourth
Amendment. The Supreme Court later explained Prouse: "The officer's

68. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
69. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
70. In Brendlin v. California,551 U.S. 249, 251 (2007), the Court held that a passenger in a
car, as well as the driver of the vehicle, is seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment when a
police officer conducts a traffic stop. Prouse had made clear that a Fourth Amendment seizure
occurs when a car is stopped and its occupants are detained, even if the stop "is limited and the
resulting detention quite brief." 440 U.S. at 653.
71. Id.; see U.S. CONST. amend. iv ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... ");
see also KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights § 15 (prohibiting unreasonable government searches and
seizures).
72. Prouse,440 U.S. at 650.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 650-51.
75. Id. at 657, 663 (expressly distinguishing suspicionless stops of vehicles at roadblocks
"where all vehicles are brought to a halt").
76. Id. at 663.
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conduct in that case was unconstitutional primarily on77 account of his
exercise of 'standardless and unconstrained discretion."'
The impact of the Prouse decision was marginalized twenty-five
years later, when the Supreme Court unanimously decided Whren v.
United States.78 In Whren, the Court held that the subjective intentions
of an officer in conducting a Fourth Amendment seizure "play no role in
ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis. 79
The defendants in Whren had argued that civil traffic regulations
should be treated differently than instances in which probable cause or
reasonable suspicion rests on other, more significant grounds. They
contended:
[T]he use of automobiles is so heavily and minutely regulated that total
compliance with traffic and safety rules is nearly impossible, a police
officer will almost invariably be able to catch any given motorist in a
technical violation. This creates the temptation to use traffic stops as a
means of investigating other law violations,
as to which no probable
80
cause or even articulable suspicion exists.
The Court rejected this argument and confirmed that breach of a simple
traffic regulation can provide an officer with reasonable grounds for a
stop, regardless of the real motives of the police for choosing a particular
car. 81 After Whren, police still need an articulable and reasonable basis
to conduct a traffic stop, but any "civil traffic violation" can suffice to
create that reason. 82 It is legally irrelevant that an officer uses a traffic
violation to investigate his or her hollow hunches that a driver is
committing a more serious offense, such as drug trafficking.83 Thus,
reading Prouse with Whren illustrates that while a police officer cannot
stop every car she chooses just because she has a "feeling" that a stop
will expose a crime, she is authorized to seize a car and its passengers
any time the officer sees a traffic violation or has other
reasonable
84
grounds to believe that the car violated a rule of the road.
77. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 39 (2000).
78. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
79. Id.at 813.
80. Id.at 810.
81. Id.at 813.
82. Id.at 808.
83. Id. at 811-12.
84. See also United States v. Ozbim, 189 F.3d 1194, 1197 (10th Cir. 1999) (providing the
Tenth Circuit's version of this standard: "[A] traffic stop is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment
at its inception if the officer has either (1)probable cause to believe a traffic violation has
occurred... or (2) a reasonable articulable suspicion that 'this particular motorist violated any one
of the multitude of applicable traffic and equipment regulations of the jurisdiction.' (citation
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After Whren, reasonable grounds for a traffic stop are lacking only
when there is no traffic violation and no other reasonable basis to believe
that a crime is being committed. Of course, if an officer falsely claims to
see a violation when she85does not, there is no reasonable suspicion or
probable cause for a stop.
B. Tenth CircuitPrecedent
The Tenth Circuit's version of Whren and its application of fog-line
statutes in states within the circuit encourage Kansas police to cite lane
drifts as grounds for a traffic stop.
1. The Tenth Circuit's Version of Whren
86
For about a decade before the decision in Whren, Tenth Circuit
precedent protected citizens against pretextual government searches and
seizures. Noting that pretextual stops "permit arbitrary intrusions
[risking that] thousands of everyday citizens who violate minor traffic
regulations would be subject to unfettered police discretion as to whom
to stop," the Tenth Circuit declared that pretextual stops by individual
officers were "unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment." 87 While recognizing that "requiring at least a minor traffic
offense" provides "some objective limitation on police intrusions," the
Tenth Circuit, at that time, found such limits too meager. 88 Instead, the
court evaluated pretextual stops by asking "whether under the same
circumstances a reasonable officer would have made the stop in the
absence of the invalid purpose. 89 If a reasonable officer would have
been uninterested in pursuing the traffic violation absent the hope of
finding drugs, other contraband, or some other serious violation of law,
then the seizure and search were deemed unconstitutional.9"

omitted)).
85. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812 (1996) (acknowledging that if an officer
"really had not seen" a traffic violation, then there is no pretext for the stop but also no probable
cause for it).
86. The Tenth Circuit includes: Kansas, Oklahoma, Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and
Wyoming.
87. United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1516 (10th Cir. 1988), overruled on other
grounds by United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783 (10th Cir. 1995) (en banc).
88. Id. at 1516.
89. Id at 1517 (quoting United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 709 (11 th Cir. 1996)).
90. Id.
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In 1995, even before the Supreme Court decided Whren, the Tenth
Circuit changed its position. In an en banc decision, the court in United
States v. Botero-Ospina, "adopt[ed] a new test" for "determining when
91
an initial stop of an automobile violates the Fourth Amendment."
Pursuant to the new standard, "a traffic stop is valid under the Fourth
Amendment if the stop is based on an observed traffic violation or if the
police officer has reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic or
equipment violation has occurred or is occurring." 92 The new rule made
it "irrelevant" that an officer held a subjectively improper motive in
addition to an objectively valid basis for a stop. 93 The Tenth Circuit said:

"Our sole inquiry is whether this particular officer had reasonable
suspicion that this particular motorist violated 'any one of the multitude
" ' 94
of applicable traffic and equipment regulations' of the jurisdiction.
The Tenth Circuit insisted that despite the change in position,
citizens were adequately protected against arbitrary police intrusion on
privacy and liberty because "if an officer's initial traffic stop, though
objectively justified by the officer's observation of a minor traffic
violation, is motivated by a desire to engage in an investigation of more
serious criminal activity, his investigation.. . will be circumscribed by
Terry [v. Ohio]'s scope requirement." 95 In Terry, the Supreme Court
held that a stop, which is reasonable at its inception, may violate the
Fourth Amendment "by virtue of its intolerable intensity and scope."96
2.

The Tenth Circuit's Fog-line Cases

While the Whren and Botero-Ospina decisions make any violation of
the rules of the road an acceptable basis for a Fourth Amendment
seizure, other decisions from the Tenth Circuit make a fog-line infraction
a particularly attractive excuse for an investigatory stop. The Tenth
Circuit has interpreted Kansas's traffic laws 97 in a way that allows police
91. 71 F.3d 783, 785 (10th Cir. 1995).
92. Id.at 787.
93. Id. Apparently a majority of the Tenth Circuit abandoned the old Guzman test, finding it
"unworkable" because of disparate application of the standard by the district courts and because in
the court's view, it interfered with principles of federalism. See Leary & Rae, supra note 7, at 1017
(critiquing the Botero-Ospinadecision).
94. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d at 787 (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979)).
95. Id. at 788. In Terry, the Supreme Court held that police are authorized to seize a person for
a limited time based on specific and articulable suspicion to believe that crime is afoot and that
officers can conduct an accompanying limited search of the person's outer clothing if there is reason
to believe that the person is armed and dangerous. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
96. Terry, 392 U.S. at 18-19.
97. The same is true of the Tenth Circuit's interpretation of similarly-worded statutes from
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to stop cars for lane violations that are physically unavoidable, present no
hazard to others, and even when the violations are committed in the
interest of promoting driver safety. Piecing together various decisions
from the Tenth Circuit, it seems that a Kansas officer may stop a car
even if the car leaves its lane of traffic only once for a brief time.
In United States v. Tang, the Tenth Circuit held that a single, but
significant, fog-line violation by the driver of a U-Haul was sufficient
reason for an officer to stop the U-Haul.98 The stop in Tang occurred
around 10:00 p.m. 99 It was a dark night, on a stretch of road with no
street lights or moonlight.10 0 There was a "mild to moderate wind." 10'
At the suppression hearing, the officer testified that he saw the
defendant's U-Haul "cross over the right side fog line" and remain there
for two hundred to three hundred yards. 10 2 After the lane drift, the
officer followed the U-Haul another mile, but the U-Haul did not leave
its lane again.'0 3 Despite the isolated lane violation and the mile with no
other infractions, the officer stopped the U-Haul. 1 4 In testimony, the
officer admitted that "it is common for people to drive over the line on
the freeway," but said that this violation was different because of "the
time of night and length of time [defendant]'s vehicle was over the fog
line."' 1 5 The trial judge found that the officer testified "credibly and
truthfully" and denied the defendant's motion to suppress. 10 6 On appeal,
the Tenth Circuit ruled that because there were no unusual weather or
road conditions that made it impractical to remain entirely within a single
lane of traffic, the officer acted lawfully in stopping the U-Haul.'0 7 In
other states, for example Utah's "fog-line" statute. See, e.g., United States v. Tang, No. 08-4179,
2009 WL 1353755 (10th Cir. May 15, 2009) (holding that stopping a vehicle for a fog-line violation
was proper despite the absence of hazard to others).
98. Id. at *6. Tang interpreted Utah's statute, not Kansas's, but the statutory language in each
statute is very similar, and the Tenth Circuit's decisions have treated the statutes similarly. Utah's
statute requires a "person operating a vehicle" to "keep the vehicle as nearly as practical entirely
within a single lane." UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6a-710(l)(a) (West 2004). Kansas's statute requires a
"vehicle" to be driven "as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane." KAN. STAT. ANN. § 81522(a) (2008).
99. Tang, 2009 WL 1353755, at *1.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.at*2.
106. Id. at *3.
107. Id. at *4 (distinguishing United States v. Gregory, 79 F.3d 973 (10th Cir. 1996), in which
the Tenth Circuit found unreasonable an officer's decision to conduct a traffic stop after a truck
briefly crossed onto the right shoulder emergency lane, given that the terrain was mountainous, the
weather was windy, and the road winding). See also United States v. Cline, 349 F.3d 1276, 1287
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Fourth Amendment terms, the stop was "reasonable," so it complied with
the Constitution.
In United States v. Alvarado, the Tenth Circuit increased the
attractiveness of fog-line violations as a basis for a traffic stop, ruling
that one incident of driving across the fog line by "about a foot" for "a
few seconds" gave the police sufficient reason to stop the car. 10 8 In
Alvarado, a Utah' 0 9 Highway Patrol Trooper testified that a Jeep
Cherokee crossed about one foot over the right fog line of the highway
and remained there for a few seconds despite "ideal driving conditions,"
including a sunny day, no wind, and a straight and flat stretch of road,
which was dry and without pot holes or debris. 10 The Tenth Circuit
affirmed the district court's finding that "there were no adverse weather
or road conditions that might have made it impractical for Alvarado to
prevent his vehicle from drifting out of the righthand lane and over the
fog line. ' 1 On its way to concluding that the trooper "had a reasonable
articulable suspicion that Alvarado, by crossing one foot over the fog
line, had violated [Utah's] § 41-6-6(1), ' 't1 2 the Tenth Circuit rejected the
defendant's argument that a typical driver "'operating a motor vehicle at
or near interstate speed limits has a difficult task of operating the vehicle
entirely within a single lane for the entirety of his trip.""'1 3 In rejecting
the defendant's argument, the Tenth Circuit explained that under its
precedent, the determination is "a fact-specific inquiry into the particular
circumstances present during the incident in question in order to
determine whether the driver could reasonably be expected to maintain a
straight course at that time in that vehicle on that roadway."' 14
Consistent with its ruling that a single violation of a fog-line statute
can create reasonable suspicion or probable cause sufficient to subject a
(10th Cir. 2003) (holding that reasonable grounds for a traffic stop existed when an officer saw a
truck swerve onto the shoulder of the road and almost hit a bridge abutment).
108. 430 F.3d 1305, 1306 (10th Cir. 2005).
109. As noted earlier, the Kansas statute and the Utah statute contain similar wording. In any
event, the Tenth Circuit has often applied its precedent involving fog-line violations in one state to a
fog-line violation in another. See United States v. Pulido-Vasquez, 311 F. App'x 140, 143 (10th Cir.
2009) (noting in the context of an evaluation of whether a fog-line violation that occurred in Kansas
gave the police reasonable suspicion, that the "factual situation of the initial stop resembles instances
in which we have found a violation of the Kansas statute or similar laws of other states" (emphasis
added)).
110. Alvarado, 430 F.3d at 1306-07.
111. ld. at 1309.
112. Id.
113. Id. (quoting defendant's argument in support of motion to suppress).
114. Id. The Tenth Circuit has also held that one abrupt swerve across the fog line lasting "about
two seconds on the shoulder" is sufficient grounds for a stop. Pulido-Vasquez, 311 F. App'x at 142,
144.
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driver and her car to a Fourth Amendment seizure, the Tenth Circuit's
cases establish that two fog-line violations are usually more than enough
reason for a traffic stop, even if a driver is operating a large vehicle, like
a motor home, which is susceptible to being blown off course by wind.
In United States v. Ozbirn, the Tenth Circuit agreed that reasonable
suspicion was created when a motor home driven on a Kansas highway
drifted onto the shoulder of the road "twice within a quarter mile under
optimal road, weather and traffic conditions." ' 1 5 The defendant did not
dispute the facts but contended that "drifting outside the marked lane
'' 16
does not establish sufficient grounds for an officer to make a stop."
Although the Tenth Circuit acknowledged that the Kansas fog-line
statute was "susceptible to rather arbitrary application by law
facts of the
enforcement officers," the court decided that on the particular
' 17
case, the trooper "had probable cause to stop Mr. Ozbirn."
As the Tenth Circuit acknowledged, fog-line violations offer the
police extensive discretion to enforce the traffic laws arbitrarily.1 8 Not
only is every driver certain to violate a single-lane requirement on
occasion," 9 but especially in Kansas, which often experiences windy
conditions, it may sometimes be physically impossible to drive entirely
within a single lane. 120 Moreover, because an officer's assertion that
such a violation occurred is difficult, if not impossible, for a driver to
refute with his own competing testimony, traffic stops for fog-line
violations give the police infinite opportunities to pick and choose which
drivers and cars they will stop. It appears that any thoughtful officer
could follow a car long enough to spot a fog-line violation, or convince
herself that the car and driver seem suspicious and that the officer would
be justified in claiming such an infraction.
Some of the proof that police can and do pick and choose among
drivers when they decide to enforce a fog-line statute is supported by the
facts of the Tenth Circuit cases reporting such violations. In case after
case, an officer stops a vehicle for drifting from its lane of traffic, but
rather than ticket the driver or undertake an investigation directed at

115. 189 F.3d 1194,1196, 1198 (10th Cir. 1999).
116. Id.
at 1198,
117. Id.In the alternative, the Tenth Circuit ruled that the trooper had reasonable suspicion of a
traffic violation to warrant a traffic stop for further investigation. Id.at 1199.
118. Id. at 1198,
119. As the officer admitted in the Tang case, it is common for drivers to drift from their own
lane of travel, at least occasionally. United States v. Tang, 332 F. App'x 446,448 (10th Cir. 2009).
120. See Mark F. Grady, Res Ipsa Loquitur and Compliance Error,142 U. PA. L. REV. 887, 900
is impossible to
(1994) (evaluating car accidents from an economics perspective and noting that "[i]t
drive a car for any period of time without missing a required precaution").
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ensuring that the driver is not falling asleep or otherwise incapable of
maintaining her lane, the officer embarks on an obvious attempt to
investigate the driver and car for drug violations or other, similarly
serious crimes. In case after case, the police offer the driver a warning
before momentarily leaving the driver and then "reconnecting" to ask
more questions and, ultimately, requesting permission to search for
contraband. Typically, the nature and subject matter of the officer's
questions show that the officer cares nothing about a lane violation and
everything about possible drug trafficking.
For example, in United States v. Gregory, an officer testified that the
defendant was not cited for a traffic violation but that during his
interaction with the driver, he became suspicious that the vehicle
contained contraband; therefore, the officer asked if the defendant was
"carrying any illegal substances in the truck" and then "if he could take a
look.' ' 12 1 Ultimately, a search of the defendant's rented U-Haul
uncovered marijuana and cocaine in plastic garbage bags in the trailer
portion of the truck.122 In United States v. Alvarado, the trooper "gave
Alvarado a written warning for crossing the fog line, returned Alvarado's
documents, and told him 'you're free to leave, drive safely,"' before
returning to the defendant's vehicle and asking the driver more questions
and "for permission to search the vehicle."'' 23 The subsequent search of
the defendant's Jeep revealed "illegal narcotics hidden in the rear."'' 24 In
United States v. Ozbirn, the trooper "finished issuing [a] warning" and
25
then "asked Mr. Ozbirn if he could ask him a few more questions."',
This colloquy was followed by an inquiry about whether the defendant
was "hauling any illegal guns, drugs, weapons, or other contraband,"
after which Mr. Ozbirn reportedly "invited" the trooper to look inside his
motor home.'

26

Packets of marijuana were eventually discovered.
128

27

In

A Kansas
United States v. Pulido-Vasquez, it was a similar story.
highway patrol trooper issued the driver a warning, returned his
"documentation," told the driver he was free to go, and then asked the
driver and the passenger "for permission to search the vehicle for
drugs."' 129 Likewise, in United States v. Egan, a Shawnee County Kansas
121. 79 F.3d 973,976 (1Oth Cir. 1996).
122. Id.at 977.
123. 430 F.3d 1305, 1307 (10th Cir. 2005).
124.
125.

Id.
189 F.3d 1194, 1196 (10th Cir. 1999).

126. Id.
127. Id. at 1197.
128.

311 F. App'x 140, 142 (10th Cir. 2009).

129. Id.
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Sheriffs Deputy stopped a "'box-type' rental moving truck" for failing
to maintain a single lane of traffic.' 30 Then, the deputy returned the
driver's license and rental truck agreement, gave her a warning, and told
her she was free to leave.' 3' Immediately thereafter, the deputy "asked if
he could ask a few more questions" and then gained permission to look
in the truck.' 32 A subsequent search133of the moving truck led officers to
find "twenty bundles of marijuana."'
The fact that fog-line cases regularly involve an officer's transparent
attempt to move quickly from discussing the traffic infraction to a search
of the vehicle or occupants for drugs, guns, or other criminal violations
strongly suggests, at least circumstantially, that police select certain cars
and drivers as a pretext to investigate those cars and their occupants, not
for fog-line violations, as they claim, but for more serious crimes for
which the police lack any reasonable grounds to stop or search the car.
Because in case after case, the police issue no citation for fog-line
infractions, which supposedly prompted the stops, it seems unlikely that
police view such violations as significant. In addition, because in each
stop, the police seek permission to search after quickly dismissing the
fog-line citation, the real motivation appears to be the search, not the
ticket or the safety concern regarding the driver's failure to maintain a
lane.
C. Kansas State Law
In Kansas, K.S.A. section 8-1522 is the "fog-line statute,"
prohibiting drivers from committing lane violations. It provides that
when a roadway is divided into two clearly marked lanes of traffic, "[a]
vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single
lane and shall not be moved from such lane until the driver has first
ascertained that such movement can be made with safety.', 134 In the past
two years, the Kansas Court of Appeals struggled to find a unified
position regarding the type of conduct that creates reasonable suspicion
or probable cause to believe that section 8-1522(a) has been breached.
As discussed below in part C.2., the Kansas Supreme Court recently
resolved the tension within the Kansas Court of Appeals. Nevertheless,
the history of the appellate decisions showcases why Kansas officers
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

256 F. App'x 191, 193 (10th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 193.
Id.
Id. at 192-93.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-1522(a) (2008).
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would choose fog-line violations as a pretext to investigate a hunch about
more substantial crimes.
1. The Kansas Court of Appeals
One line of cases from the Court of Appeals required a fog-line
violation, plus a determination that a lane drift was unsafe. A second
competing line of cases from the same court rejected the need for a
finding of dangerousness. In State v. Ross, a three-judge panel of the
Court of Appeals held that the "as nearly as practicable" language in the
traffic statute precluded an officer from conducting a traffic stop when
she observes a driver cross the fog line only once during two miles of
observation. 3 5 Judges McAnany, Pierron, and Bukaty all agreed that the
defendant's failure to maintain a single lane of traffic "[did] not
necessarily constitute a violation of K.S.A. 8-1522(a).' 36 The panel
explained further: "'As nearly as practicable' connotes something less
than the absolute. Automobiles are not railway locomotives. They do
not run on fixed rails.' 37 The panel said that cars are permitted to move
from a single lane "after first determining it is safe to do so. ' ' The
panel concluded that whether reasonable suspicion exists for a traffic
stop turns on whether "the totality of the circumstances ...

make it

appear to the officer that not only did the defendant's vehicle move from
13 9
,
its lane of travel, but it left its lane when it was not safe to do So.
Applying the facts to its announced interpretation of section 8-1522(a),
in Ross decided that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion for
the panel
140
a stop.

There was no testimony that there was any obstacle or barrier on the
shoulder that presented an immediate danger. There was no testimony
that sand, gravel, or debris on the shoulder presented a hazard to a
motorist who directed his or her vehicle onto the shoulder. There was
not testimony that [the officer] was concerned that the driver might
have been falling asleep or was intoxicated. [The driver's] vehicle was
not weaving back and forth on the roadway. He was not using the
paved shoulder as a regular lane of travel. He crossed the fog line only
135. State v. Ross, 149 P.3d 876, 878-80 (Kan. Ct. App. 2007).
136. Id. at 879.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Although the Court of Appeals ultimately found that the officer lacked probable cause to
stop the defendant's car, the stop proved successful in uncovering contraband and illegality. The
defendant lacked a valid driver's license and was concealing cocaine in his pockets. Id. at 878.
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briefly, for only a short distance, and only once. In short, there was no
reasonable suspicion that [the driver] was engaged in the conduct that is
at the heart of the statute: moving a vehicle from 4its lane of travel
without first ascertaining that it could be done safely.1 1
Less than a year after the decision in Ross, a different three-judge
panel (consisting of Judges Greene, Malone, and Leben) interpreted the
same statute in a contrary way, expressly "declin[ing] to follow the Ross
court's interpretation.', 142 In State v. Marx, the government appealed
from the trial court's ruling granting the defendants' motions to
suppress. 143 A sheriffs deputy had relied on K.S.A. section 8-1522 in
stopping the defendants' motor home for failure to maintain a single
lane.' 44 The officer said he stopped the vehicle "after he saw it cross the
fog line, overcorrect, and cross the centerline."'' 45 After the stop, the
deputy obtained and checked the occupants' licenses and vehicle
registration, confirmed they were valid, and handed the documentation
and a warning ticket to the occupants before telling the driver that she
"was free to leave."' 146 The deputy then asked the driver if she would
answer a few more questions, asked if the motor home concealed drugs,
and asked for permission to search it. 147 When the driver refused
consent, the deputy told her that he intended to use a drug dog to sniff the
exterior of the vehicle. 48 The driver then entered the motor home
apparently, began disposing of
against the directives of the deputy and,
149
illegal drugs in the home's septic tank.
The appellate panel in Marx found ample reasonable suspicion for
the initial stop. In reaching this conclusion, the court expressly declined
to follow the Ross court's interpretation of section 8-1522(a), explaining:
"The 'nearly as practicable' language allows a driver to momentarily
move outside a lane of traffic due to special circumstances such as
weather conditions or an obstacle in the road. Otherwise, the driver must
141. Id. at 880. In State v. Hawk, a panel comprised of Judges McAnany, Pierron, and
Standridge characterized the holding in Ross this way: "Under Ross, an officer does not have
reasonable suspicion that K.S.A. 8-1522 has been violated unless the totality of the circumstances
makes it appear that the defendant moved his or her vehicle from its lane of travel when it was not
safe to do so." State v. Hawk, No. 100,096, 2009 WL 744362, at *4 (Kan. Ct. App. Mar. 13, 2009).
142. State v. Marx, 171 P.3d 276, 283 (Kan. Ct. App. 2007), affd in part, rev'd in part, 215
P.3d 601 (Kan. 2009).
143. ld. at 278.
144. Id. at 278-79.
145.

Id. at 279.

146. Id.
147. Jd.
148.

Id.

149. Id.
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stay in one lane."' 5 0
As for who must establish the "special
circumstances" causing the car to drift, the panel said: "[I]f there was a
special circumstance such as an obstacle in the road which caused [the
driver] to swerve the motor home, it would seem that this is evidence
only she could provide. The State is not required to prove a negative."' 5'
The panel in Marx was unwilling to uphold the trial court's decision
to grant the motion to suppress, even if there had been special
circumstances requiring a safe driver to leave her lane of traffic.
According to the panel, "[E]ven if [the driver] subsequently provided a
legitimate defense for moving from her lane of traffic, such as to avoid
an obstacle in the road, this would not invalidate the stop as long as [the
officer] reasonably
believed in good faith that a traffic violation had
52
occurred."'
Combined, Ross and Marx demonstrate that when Marx was decided,
six of the thirteen judges on the Kansas Court of Appeals were evenly
divided on what it meant to commit a fog-line violation, which, in turn,
gives an officer a legal basis to stop a car and conduct additional
investigation in a face-to-face environment, offering police the chance to
ask probing questions and for permission to search. Three judges
seemed to think almost any drift was enough; three others wanted to
require a lane drift plus a safety inquiry.
As a practical matter, the reasoning and holding in Ross made fogline violations significantly less attractive as a pretext to stop cars for
ulterior reasons. Following Ross, an officer could not just cite a minor
lane drift to explain a stop; rather, she had to explain in a credible and
logical way why there were reasonable grounds to think the driver acted
unsafely. This more detailed and extended testimony offered fodder for
cross-examination of the officer. If the officer's narrative explanation
was unconvincing, the judge might reject the officer's testimony and
suppress the evidence.
In contrast, under Marx, any reasonably
competent officer could credibly articulate a lane drift as grounds for a
traffic stop because no other explanation was needed. Such a cursory
and conclusory bit of testimony would be almost impossible to refute
through cross-examination or otherwise.
Less than two years after joining the decision in Marx, Judge Greene
wrote a dissenting opinion in State v. Tinoco, indicating that he had
changed his mind about fog-line violations. In Tinoco, Judge Greene
150.
151.

Id.at 283.
Id.

152. Id.See also State v. Hawk, No. 100,096, 2009 WL 744362, at *4 (Kan. Ct. App. Mar. 13,
2009) (interpreting Marx as declining to follow Ross).
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adopted both the rationale and outcome in Ross, stating, "I would prefer
to follow the rationale and outcome of the panel in State v. Ross ....
Although I joined the majority in State v. Marx,... I did so only because
of the obvious factual distinction there."' 53 Judge Greene continued:
The result of the majority's decision is to license stops for conduct that
is occasionally, if not routinely, exhibited by nearly every driver on the
road. I would put a stop to such stops. Unless the driver exhibits
conduct 54like that in Marx, we should not sanction any deprivation of
liberty.1
Although Tinoco allowed Judge Greene to express his new preference for
Ross, the decision gave two other appellate judges an opportunity 1to
55
distance themselves from the reasoning in the Ross decision.
Although Judges Pierron' 56 and Standridge concluded that the
defendant's appeal probably failed under the holding of either Ross or
Marx, they emphasized that the appellate court "has declined to follow
Ross in its more recent decision [Marx]. ' 5 7 The two judges further
noted that "Tenth Circuit cases that were decided after Ross ha[d] been
critical" of the decision. 158 Thus, as of June 5, 2009, when the Court of
Appeals issued Tinoco, three judges' 59 appeared to favor the Ross safety
test for fog-line violations, and four 60 seemed to favor the Marx nonsafety test.
2. Recent Word from the Kansas Supreme Court
The Kansas Supreme Court recently reviewed State v. Marx,
undertaking its own interpretation of K.S.A. section 8-1522(a) to
"resolve the conflict between Ross and Marx as to the conduct proscribed
16 1
by [subsection (a)], i.e., to determine the elements of the offense."'
153. See State v. Tinoco, No. 100,435, 2009 WL 1591644, at *5 (Kan. Ct. App. Jun. 5, 2009)
(Greene, J., dissenting).
154. Id.
155.

Judges Pierron and Standridge affirmed the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to

suppress. The motion turned on whether a Kansas Highway Patrol Trooper had sufficient legal
cause to stop a defendant for failing to maintain a single lane when the driver swerved two tire
widths over a dividing line and into another lane of traffic on one occasion. Tinoco, 2009 WL
1591644, at *4-5.
156. As noted earlier, Judge Pierron was part of the panel that decided Ross.
157.

Tinoco, 2009WL 1591644, at *4.

158.
159.
160.
161.

Id.
Judges McAnany, Bukaty, and Greene.
Judges Pierron, Malone, Leben, and Standridge.
215 P.3d 601, 608 (Kan. 2009), affg in part, rev'g in part 171 P.3d 276 (Kan. Ct. App.
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The court sought to "intuit the most logical meaning to ascribe to this
legislative language."'' 62 After parsing the statute, the court concluded
163
that section 8-1522(a) establishes "two separate rules of the road."
The first rule "requires a driver to keep entirely within a single lane
while traveling on a roadway with two or more clearly marked lanes,"
but this rule is "temporarily suspended when it becomes impracticable to
stay within the lane markers and when the driver is properly effecting a
lane change."' 64 Therefore, "[p]roof that driving outside the lane
markers created no safety hazard is not a defense to the single lane
rule., 165 The safety issue arises, according to the Kansas Supreme Court,
only in the second instance.
The second rule provides that before a driver may change lanes or
move from the current lane of travel to another location, he or she must
ascertain that the movement can be made with safety. A traffic
infraction 66occurs under K.S.A. 8-1522(a) when either rule of the road is
violated.'
The court emphasized: "[T]he statute does not make safety a part of the
equation for determining a violation of the single lane rule.' 67
Turning to whether the facts of the Marx case gave the officer
reasonable grounds to conduct a stop, the court noted that "K.S.A. 81522(a) is not a strict liability offense" and that the "as nearly as
practicable" language in the statute "contradicts the notion that any and
all intrusions upon the marker lines of the chosen travel lane constitute a
violation.0 68 The court acknowledged that weather conditions and
obstacles in the road could make it impracticable to maintain a single
lane of traffic and then went further: "[T]he statute even dilutes the
practicability standard. It does not say 'when practicable' a vehicle will
be driven entirely within a single lane. It only requires compliance with
the single lane rule as nearly as practicable, i.e., compliance that is close
to that which is feasible."' 169 Thus, concluded the court, "a detaining
officer must articulate something more than an observation of one

2007).
162. Id. at610.

163. Id. at612.
164.
165.

Id.
Id.

166. Id.
167.
168.

Id.
Id.

169. Id.
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instance of a momentary lane breach."1 70 But, the fact that a driver
leaves a 7single lane without endangering himself or others is
irrelevant.1

1

Accordingly, after the Kansas Supreme Court's decision in Marx, to
justify a stop, an officer need not provide an explanation about how the
fog-line drift created danger, a relatively tough standard, probably
requiring a significant amount of explanation. 72 However, an officer
must be able to explain why it was feasible, given the circumstances, for
the driver to stay within the lane markers.1 73 While requiring some
explanation, the standard adopted by the court will probably be met
whenever an officer credibly testifies that there was little wind, no road
obstructions, and a relatively straight stretch of road.174 This type of
testimony will allow some opportunity for a talented cross-examiner to
reveal inconsistencies in the officer's explanation that might suggest the
supposed fog-line violation was concocted as an excuse to investigate for
drugs, but it falls short of requiring extensive testimony that the danger
test (established by Ross) would have encouraged. Thus, like current
Tenth Circuit case law, Kansas state court decisions offer no special
75
protection against pretextual traffic stops based on fog-line infractions. 1
Although the Kansas courts have provided no special protections
from pretextual stops that begin with traffic infractions, the Kansas
Supreme Court has imposed one limit on pretextual traffic stops, thereby
implicitly recognizing that such stops can, at least sometimes, infringe on
176
Fourth Amendment (and comparable Kansas constitutional) rights.
170. Id.
171. See id (finding that safety is "not a part of the equation" in ascertaining whether or not
there has been a breach of the single lane requirement).

172. Id.
173. Id. at 612 (stating that an officer must articulate whether or not he knew of circumstances
"making it impracticable to stay within lane markers," such as a weather-related issue or a physical

object in the lane).
174. See id. at 613 (explaining the testifying officer just needs to give a rendition of what he
knew, when he knew it, and "whether the known facts provided him with a reasonable and good
faith belief that a traffic infraction had occurred").
175. See id. at 605 (concluding that when an officer can articulate facts demonstrating probable
cause to conduct a traffic stop, the seizure is valid even if pretextual).
176. Kansans are protected by both the Fourth Amendment in the federal Constitution and a
comparable provision in the Kansas Constitution. KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights § 15 protects Kansans
against unreasonable searches and seizures, stating:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons and property against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall be inviolate; and no warrant shall issue but on probable
cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or property to be seized.
Unlike some other states' constitutions, which provide citizens with more protection from
governmental intrusions on privacy and liberty than does the federal Constitution, the Kansas
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Kansas officers are prohibited from claiming that there was reason to
believe that a citizen needed help
and that a stop was conducted for
"community caretaking purposes"' 17 7 as a ruse for a drug investigation. 178
As the court noted in State v. Marx, "permitting the public safety
rationale to serve as a pretext for an investigative detention runs the risk
of emasculating our Fourth Amendment protections. 17 9
Of course, a similar emasculation argument can be, and has been,
made about pretextual traffic stops for minor traffic infractions. As
Justice Johnson recently said in his dissent in State v. Greever, a traffic
infraction case in which the defendant reportedly failed to signal a turn,
"I am concerned about expanding the circumstances under which law
enforcement officers are legally permitted to engage in profiling to select
targets of investigatory detentions." 180 While acknowledging the holding
in Whren, Justice Johnson continued:
In my view, that holding permits an officer to select any particular
profile-Hispanics, teenagers, soccer moms, long-haired men, etc.and target those individuals for seizure to investigate any crime
perceived to be prevalent among the particular group, so long as the
officer can
traffic infraction, no matter how
.. identify a. preceding
. • .. 181
innocuous or esoteric the violation.
Justice Johnson's concern that Whren and its Kansas progeny will
result in racial (or other arbitrary) profiling is not without factual support.
A study published in 2003 concluded that several Kansas police
departments were stopping a disproportionate number of black and
Hispanic people. 182 Recognizing the detrimental effects of racial
profiling, the Kansas legislature has expressly prohibited the practice. 183
Supreme Court has interpreted Section 15 as providing "identical" rights as those protected by the
Fourth Amendment. See State v. Morris, 72 P.3d 570, 576 (Kan. 2003) ("Section 15 of the Kansas
Bill of Rights provides protection identical to that provided under the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution."). Thus, a Kansas defendant must convince the trial judge that the
federal Constitution has been violated or her Section 15 claim fails.
177. See Marx, 215 P.3d at 606 (explaining that the "primary motivation for a valid public safety
stop must be for community caretaking purposes"). Community caretaking stops would include
stops to tell a motorist that the gas cap to his car is open or missing, that his trunk is open, that his
door is ajar, and to return a hubcap that an officer sees a vehicle lose.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. State v. Greever, 183 P.3d 788, 800 (Kan. 2008) (Johnson, J., dissenting).
181. Id.
182. See A MultjurisdictionalAssessment, supra note 23, at 53-54, 80-81, 90, 105, 111-12,
127. Studies in other states have made similar findings. See, e.g., O'Neill, supra note 45, at 747,
771-72.
183. See KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-4606, -4608 (2007) (defining racial profiling and making it
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IV. SOME OBSERVATIONS ABOUT THE FOG-LINE DATA

At a minimum, the Fourth Amendment requires police to act
84
reasonably when they stop a car or search a person or vehicle.1
Arguably, acting reasonably would preclude pretextual searches or
seizures, in which the police rely on personal animus or unreliable
stereotypes-race, ethnicity, skin color, or out-of-state status-in
Perhaps for the reasons
selecting targets for their traffic stops.
articulated by Justice Johnson in State v. Greever,185 under such a theory
of reasonableness, Kansas police would violate the Fourth Amendment
whenever they intentionally select all or only Hispanic drivers to enforce
K.S.A. section 8-1522(a).
Despite the intuitive strength of defining Fourth Amendment
reasonableness in this way, Whren established a different test, one that
expressly rejects any notion that individual officers are precluded from
conducting pretextual traffic stops, even if officers choose the targets of
their stops by unlawful, even unconstitutional, 8 6 criteria. If an officer
has reason to believe that a driver has violated a traffic regulation, the
officer may lawfully stop the car, even if his real desire is to investigate
for drug trafficking, gun possession, fraud, or another crime for which he
lacks evidence and reasonable suspicion. The Fourth Amendment makes
it irrelevant that the officer picks his target based on good looks, color,
ethnicity, apparent social status, vehicle type, out-of-state plates, or for
some other arbitrary reason, such as harassment. Because Whren
permits, if187not fosters, racist stops, the decision has been repeatedly
criticized.
unlawful for any law-enforcement officer to engage in it).
184. See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 855 n.4 (2006) (describing reasonableness as the
"touchstone" of the Fourth Amendment).
185. See State v. Greever, 183 P.3d at 800 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
186. Although beyond the scope of this Article, pretextual stops might, for instance, violate the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits state actors to "deny to any
person ... the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.See generally Jennifer
A. Larrabee, Note, "DWB (Driving While Black)" and Equal Protection: The Realities of an
Unconstitutional Police Practice, 6 J. L. & POL'Y 291, 295 (1997) (arguing "that the Equal
Protection Clause should prevent the police from considering the race of a motorist when deciding
whom to detain for a traffic violation").
187. See, e.g., Angela J. Davis, Race, Cops, and Traffic Stops, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425, 427
(1997) (arguing that Whren left African-Americans and Latinos without an effective remedy for
discriminatory pretextual traffic stops); David A. Harris, "Driving While Black" and All Other
Traffic Offenses: The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. GRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
544, 545-46 (1997) (arguing that Whren makes any citizen fair game for a traffic stop but will result
in police stopping hugely disproportionate numbers of African-Americans and Hispanics);
Christopher Hall, Note, Challenging Selective Enforcement of Traffic Regulations After the
Disharmonic Convergence: Whren v. United States, United States v. Armstrong, and the Evolution
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For instance, scholars have pointed out that Whren may result in the
under-enforcement of the law and may cause police to unduly intrude on
the privacy and liberty of innocent people of color. 88 As applied to the
data gathered for this Article, the under-enforcement argument means
that Kansas officers may have discovered more illegality had they been
looking for unlawful conduct by all drivers, not just out-of-state cars and
cars driven by brown-skinned people. Potentially, the officers' use of
stereotypes dulled their senses and caused them to overlook reasonable
suspicion in cases of non-Hispanic drivers, resulting189in too little
enforcement of Caucasian or African-American criminals.
On the undue intrusion point, the fog-line data does not account for
any of the fog-line traffic stops in which Kansas police searched without
finding contraband. Searches during which the police found no drugs are
never challenged in criminal court. 190 Therefore, it is likely that the data
significantly underrepresents the number of times Kansas officers
stopped cars for pretextual reasons, then asked the occupants for, and
received permission to search, but found no drugs, guns, or aliens.
"[T]he [exclusionary] rule by its very nature only has the potential to
address a portion of police violations."'' 9 1 As a result, we have no way of
knowing how many times Kansas officers relied on stereotypes in
conducting a stop and one or more searches that interfered with the
liberty and personal privacy of people of color but failed to uncover a
crime.
Critics of Whren have also argued that the decision encourages racial
profiling and that, in turn, racial profiling undermines faith in the entire
criminal justice system. David Harris, one of the prominent experts on
racial profiling, has described the consequences this way:
of Police Discretion, 76 TEX. L. REv. 1083, 1085 (1998) (asserting that Whren rendered the Fourth
Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause "essentially useless" in countering selective
enforcement of the law).
188. See Davis, supra note 187, at 427; O'Neill, supra note 45, at 747, 771-72 (reciting
literature and studies of "disturbing racial disparities in traffic enforcement" including study of stops
throughout Illinois in which officers "utilized consent searches against Hispanic drivers more than
twice as often as against Caucasian drivers" although "searches of Caucasians were twice as likely to
discover contraband as were the searches of minorities").
189. See O'Neill, supra note 45, at 771-72; David Cole, Profiles in Policing, CHAMPION, Apr.
2002, at 12, 16 (citing studies showing that whites are at least as likely to carry drugs as blacks or
Hispanics).
190. Data from a study of the Wichita Police Department revealed that stops of pedestrians and
cars leading to searches resulted in the seizure of contraband in only about 3.3% of stops.
WITHROW, supra note 28, at 47.
191. L. Timothy Perrin et al., If It's Broken, Fix It: Moving Beyond the Exclusionary Rule: A
New and Extensive EmpiricalStudy of the Exclusionary Rule and a Callfor a Civil Administrative
Remedy to PartiallyReplace the Rule, 83 IOWA L. REV. 669, 675 (1998).
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It has a corrosive effect on the legitimacy of the entire justice system.
It deters people of color from cooperating with the police in criminal
investigations. And in the courtroom, it causes jurors of all races and
ethnicities to doubt the testimony of police officers when they serve as
witnesses, making criminal cases more difficult to win. 192
The five fog-line cases show why racial profiling would have this
result. Officers in each fog-line case testified about wind and road
conditions and lane drifts, but mentioned nothing about skin color,
behavior suggesting drug trafficking, or the reliability of stereotypes at
predicting crime. The officers rarely mentioned the significance of outof-state plates and even when they did, it was in response to crossexamination. There is no claim by even one Kansas officer that all (or
most) drug-traffickers who travel the roads in Kansas are Mexican,
Puerto Rican, or Central or South American. None of the officers
testified that they saw a driver with brown skin, so they followed the car
to look for suspicious behavior that might indicate drug trafficking and,
while watching for such behavior, saw the driver deviate from his lane of
travel. At least in some of the cases, if not in all of them, this seems to
be the reality. Because the pattern of stops suggests that these factorsskin color, vague suspicion of drug trafficking, and out-of-state statusplayed a role, probably a significant one, in all five of the stops that
formed the basis of the motions to suppress decided between August 1,
2008 and September 9, 2009, the officers' testimony should mirror these
facts, if truthful and forthright.
If the officers were convinced that they acted reasonably by targeting
people of color traveling from out of state, or people of Hispanic
ethnicity who were driving rental vehicles, why did they avoid the
subject and hedge on the reasons for the stops? In at least one case,
United States v. Jose Maldonado,193 the officer expressly denied that race
or ethnicity was a factor.' 94 Given the Supreme Court's express
sanctioning of pretextual stops, why wouldn't Kansas officers candidly
testify to the real circumstances for initiating an investigation?
It is possible that the officers did not discuss these reasons because
these characteristics did not impact their decisions to stop the cars.
Perhaps it is merely a coincidence that all of the fog-line stops involved
192. Harris, supra note 187, at 3. See also I. Bennett Capers, Crime, Legitimacy, and Testilying,
83 IND. L.J. 835, 838-41, 862 (2008) (providing an overview of some of the scholarly literature
arguing that injustices directed at people of color create disrespect for the system).
193. 614 F. Supp. 2d 1179 (D. Kan. 2009).
194. Transcript of Proceedings (Feb. 26, 2009), supra note 46, at 28 (officer denying that he
chose to follow defendant's vehicle because defendant was an Hispanic driver).
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Hispanic occupants. Given the small sample size, this conclusion is
plausible.' 95 It is also possible that the officers did not document these
reasons and offer them in explanation at the hearings because while skin
color and other reasons played some role, they played only a
subconscious one in the officers' thinking. Perhaps the officers were not
cognizant of their true selection criteria and, therefore, did not document
the reasons or testify about them on direct examination. Finally, it is at
least equally likely that the officers consciously considered the factors
and acted on them, but knowing that the public (and Kansas's district
court judges) would be troubled by such seemingly arbitrary and
morally-suspect standards for a criminal investigation, the officers
struggled to identify other, more palatable bases to stop a car and
investigate its occupants.196 Because Whren allows a seizure for any
traffic infraction, officers and prosecutors were not legally obligated to
tell the whole story. The government's case can survive a motion to
suppress as long as a preponderance of the evidence shows that the
officer had some reasonable basis for the stop and that he did not
subsequently exceed the scope of reasonableness during a follow-up
investigation.
The pattern in Kansas fog-line stops makes it appear that Kansas
police are engaging in ethnicity-based profiling. Yet the testimony of
Kansas officers fails to explain why such profiles are valid or to explain
that the ethnicity of the drivers and occupants was nothing more than a
coincidence. Even if the United States Supreme Court precedent makes
such an explanation legally irrelevant, the lack of transparency in the
officers' testimony causes police to appear dishonest. To the extent
police strain to cover up the real reasons for a traffic stop, their testimony
will appear contrived and untruthful, creating public and judicial distrust
of their otherwise laudable work. Perhaps this taint of untruth explains
why the district judges granted 40% of the defendants' motions to
suppress in the five fog-line cases.
Finally, if it turns out that discriminatory fog-line police stops in
Kansas are not a coincidence and that they reflect a police policy of
discrimination, the stops may be unconstitutional notwithstanding

195. It is less plausible, however, given that many of the published Tenth Circuit decisions also
appear to involve Hispanic defendants.
196. See Harris, supra note 187, at 19 ("Pretextual traffic stops fuel the belief that the police are
not only unfair and biased, but untruthful as well. Each pretextual traffic stop involves an untruth,
and both the officer and the driver recognize this.... Stopping a driver for a traffic offense when the
officer's real purpose is drug interdiction is a lie-a legally sanctioned one, to be sure, but a lie
nonetheless.").
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Although the Supreme Court has ruled that an individual
officer's conduct will be judged by an objective, Fourth Amendment
standard, the Court has yet to decide that programmatic motives are
irrelevant in the investigation of criminal conduct. If police departments
within Kansas encourage or acquiesce in a policy to follow and
investigate Hispanic drivers as a pretext for drug investigations, the
principles of Whren do not apply. 198 Whren did not hold that law
enforcement agencies act "reasonably" when they adopt discriminatory
policies governing investigations. Arguably, programmatic motives
should and do matter, even in traffic stops, and even after Whren.
As the United States Supreme Court recognized in City of
Indianapolisv. Edmond,199 "while '[s]ubjective intentions play no role in
ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis,' programmatic
purposes may be relevant to the validity of Fourth Amendment intrusions
undertaken pursuant to a general scheme without individualized
suspicion.... Whren does not preclude an inquiry into programmatic
Although Edmond too is readily
purpose in such contexts. 2 °°
distinguishable from the typical fog-line case because it concerned the
legality of a suspicionless roadblock, the principles of Edmond should
extend to cases in which every member of a police department is
expected to pursue, follow, and investigate cars tagged from out-of-state
but ignore those who cross the fog line but bear a Kansas tag. The
principles of Edmond should also apply to a police policy that
encourages all officers to stop disproportionate numbers of Hispanic
drivers in an effort to catch drug dealers. As the Court indicated in
Edmond, "cases dealing with intrusions that occur pursuant to a general
scheme absent individualized suspicion have often required an inquiry
into purpose at the programmatic level."' 0 ' The limited data, which
197. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 224610 (2008) (requiring all Kansas law enforcement agencies to
adopt a written policy prohibiting racial profiling).
198. Because Kansas requires a written policy prohibiting racial profiling, it will be difficult to
prove that a department's actual policy is different. Nevertheless, a department may condone
profiling informally or train their officers in ways that promote discriminatory stops notwithstanding
a formal and written policy to the contrary. The 2003 study showing that multiple police
departments in Kansas were engaging in discriminatory stops is evidence that officers may be acting
pursuant to such a police custom, culture, or "policy," even if the policy is informal and contrary to
the department's written policy. See A MultiurisdictionalAssessment, supra note 23, at 11.
199. 531 U.S. 32,40(2000).
200. Id. at 45-46 (citation omitted).
201. Id.at 46. See also Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990) ("[A]n inventory search must not
be a ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence."); Colorado v.
Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372 (1987) (indicating that bad faith and the lack of a pure investigative
purpose mattered to the validity of an inventory search, a search that does not rest on reasonable
suspicion or probable cause).
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show a pattern of stopping cars with no intention of ticketing the drivers,
suggests that some police departments within Kansas may have
programmatic policies encouraging officers to investigate certain types
of cars and drivers for drugs, regardless of suspicion. If so, these policies
should be governed by cases limiting suspicionless seizures and searches
of drivers and cars. Thus, under the reasoning of Edmond, such
suspicionless investigations violate the Fourth Amendment.
V. CONCLUSION
In Whren, the United States Supreme Court sanctioned pretextual
traffic stops. In practice the holding of Whren condones police
investigations that target certain suspect classes of people, like
Hispanics, for increased police scrutiny. In permitting pretextual stops,
the Court ignored the risk that such practices will encourage police to
distort the truth, overlooked the cost of under-enforcement of the laws,
and ignored the consequences to the criminal justice system of race and
ethnicity based discrimination.
Kansas law exacerbates these risks by making fog-line stops a model
for protecting ulterior motives from a sifting judicial inquiry. In Kansas,
it makes no difference that every driver occasionally crosses the fog line
or that an individual driver left his lane without presenting any danger to
another person, object, or animal. As long as a Kansas officer can
credibly testify that the weather and road conditions made it practicable
to stay within a single lane but that the driver did not, the officer has
grounds for a stop, which gives him a chance to ask to search.
Despite Kansas officers' apparent practice of stopping certain cars
and certain people, claiming that the cars left their primary lane of travel,
and notwithstanding that federal and Kansas law make fog-line
infractions easy to prove, judges in the District of Kansas have granted
40% of motions to suppress evidence in recent fog-line cases. The
relative success of defendants at suppressing evidence in these cases
should cause Kansas police to question the effectiveness of pretextual
fog-line stops, especially given the risk that the public will perceive
pretextual stops as motivated by skin color and ethnicity and considering
the evidence from other states that discriminatory searches are
counterproductive in uncovering crime.
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